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Abstract—Statistical divergence is widely applied in multi-
media processing, basically due to regularity and explainable
features displayed in data. However, in a broader range of data
realm, these advantages may not out-stand, and therefore a
more general approach is required. In data detection, statistical
divergence can be used as an similarity measurement based on
collective features. In this paper, we present a collective detection
technique based on statistical divergence. The technique extracts
distribution similarities among data collections, and then uses
the statistical divergence to detect collective anomalies. Our
technique continuously evaluates metrics as evolving features
and calculates adaptive threshold to meet the best mathematical
expectation. To illustrate details of the technique and explore its
efficiency, we case-studied a real world problem of click farming
detection against malicious online sellers. The evaluation shows
that these techniques provided efficient classifiers. They were
also sufficiently sensitive to a much smaller magnitude of data
alteration, compared with real world malicious behaviours. Thus,
it is applicable in the real world.
I. INTRODUCTION
Statistical divergence is widely applied in multimedia pro-
cessing. Prevalent applications include multimedia event de-
tection [1], content classification [2], [3] and qualification [4],
[5]. It has been attracting more attention since the dawn of big
data era, basically due to regularity and interpretable features
displayed in the data. However, in a broader range of data
realm, these advantages may not out-stand (e.g. in online sales
data records). It requires a more general approach.
Currently, there are more than 2.7ZB data in the digital
universe [6] and the growing speed is doubling every two
years. It has already been hard and will be much harder
in the future to harness the exploding volume of data that
has resulted in many problems in data management and
engineering, threatening trustworthiness and reliability of data
flows inside working systems. Data error rate in enterprises is
approximately 1% to 5%, and for some, even above 30% [7].
Those data anomalies may arise due to both internal and
external reasons.
On one hand, components inside systems may generate
problematic source data. For example, in a sensor network,
some sensors may generate erroneous data when it experiences
power failure or other extreme conditions [8]. Data packages
will be lost if sensor nodes fail to connect to network or some
sensor hubs break down [9]. Also, human operators act as
a heavily vulnerable part to bugs and mistakes. Malicious
insiders even deliberately modify system configurations for
fatal compromises [10]. A study shows that 65% of organi-
zations state that human errors are the main cause of data
problems [11] .
On the other hand, data manipulation [12] from outside
hackers composes another potential threat of data quality
and reliability. Data Manipulation here, according to a NSA
definition, refers to that “hackers can infiltrate networks via
any attack vector, find their way into databases and appli-
cations and change information contained in those systems,
rather than stealing data and holding it for ransom”. If data
is compromised, it will severely affect mining and learning
algorithms and further change the final decision driven by
the data. In 2013, hackers from Syria put up fake reports via
Associated Press’ Twitter account and caused a 150-point drop
in the Dow [13].
It is hard to detect a single record that is alerted but still
remain in correct value scopes, but if sufficient data records are
altered to change a final decision, we can still detect malicious
data manipulation behaviours. According to our observation,
typical manipulations on numerical data will lead to a drift or
distortion of its original distribution. For measurable reshap-
ing, we can enclose data collections with similar distribution
patterns and filter out those strangely shaped ones. To address
problems caused by data manipulation, we proposed a novel
technique which sorts out manipulated data collections from
normal ones by adopting statistical divergence. In this paper,
we focus on a concrete data manipulation problem: click
farming in online shops, and try to apply our technique to
pick out those dishonest sellers. Our technique maps data
collections to points in distribution spaces and reduce the
problem to classical point anomaly detection. Optimizations
estimate ground truth, mapping each data collection into a
single real number within a definite interval. Then a Gaussian
classifier can be applied to detect outliers derived from ma-
nipulated data. To automatically calculate adaptive threshold
for the classifier, we keep two evidence sets for both normal
points and anomalies, taking advantage of the property pro-
vided by statistical divergence. In the dynamic environments,
these evidence sets are modified after every data collection is
checked, in which manner they act intuitively as slide windows
and keep up to the evolving features in dynamic scenarios.
Our contribution includes: 1) A brief review on data anomaly
detection and a study on the problem of click farming; 2)
Detailed description of both basic and optimized framework
of our technique, resolving several technical difficulties such
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as automated adaptive threshold; 3) Real world and synthetic
data experiments that test efficiency of our technique and a
comparison with a previous work on the same topic.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section II
states related work on data anomaly detection and describes a
real world problem. Section III introduces statistical distance.
Details of proposed technique are introduced in section IV.
Then section V presents evaluation results and further findings
of the algorithm. Finally, the paper is concluded in section VI.
II. RELATED WORK
A. Data Anomaly Detection
Statistical divergence was applied mainly as classifiers on
multimedia content [3], especially as kernels in SVMs [2]. As
a similarity measurement, it can also be used in qualitative and
quantitative analysis in image evaluation [4], [5]. [1] adopted
divergence to detect events in multimedia streams.
Anomaly detection, also known as outlier detection, has
been studied for a long time and discussed in diverse re-
search domains, such as fraud detection, intrusion detection,
system monitoring, fault detection and event detection in
sensor networks. Anomaly detection algorithms deal with
input data in the form of points (or records), sequences, graphs
and spatial and geographical relationships. [14] According to
relationships within data records, outliers can be classified into
point anomalies, contextual (or conditional) anomalies and
collective anomalies. [15]
Currently, distance based [16], [17] and feature evolv-
ing algorithms [18], [19], [20] catch most attention. Others
adopted tree isolation [21], model based [22] and statistical
methods [23] in certain applications.
To detect collective anomalies, [24] adopts the ART (Adop-
tive Resonance Theory) neural networks to detect time-series
anomalies. Box Modeling is proposed in [25]. Longest Com-
mon Subsequence was leveraged in [26] as similarity metric for
symbolic sequence. Markovian modeling techniques are also
popular in this domain[27], [28], [29]. [30] depicts groups in
social media as combinations of different “roles” and compare
groups according to the proportion of each role within each
group.
Wang et al. proposed a technique, Multinomial Goodness-
of-Fit (MGoF), to analyze likelihood ratio of distributions via
Kullback-Leibler divergence, and is fundamentally a hypoth-
esis test on distributions [31]. MGoF divides the observed
data sequence into several windows. It quantifies data in each
window into a histogram and check these estimated distri-
butions against several hypothesis. If the target distribution
rejects all provided hypothesis, it is considered an anomaly
and preserved as a new candidate of null hypothesis. If the
target distribution failed to reject some hypothesis, then it is
considered a supporting evidence of the one that yields most
similarity. Furthermore, if the number of supporting evidence
is larger than a threshold cth, it is classified as non-anomaly.
MGoF is the best competitor out of the similar techniques,
and we use it as our baseline against our approach.
B. Real World Problem: Click Farming Detection
Taobao possesses a market share of 50.6% to 56.2% in
China by 2016 [32]. Currently, there are more than 9.4 million
sellers in Taobao, providing more than 1 billion different prod-
ucts. Under the super-pressure caused by massive competitors,
a number of the sellers choose to use some cheating techniques
to raise reputation and sale volumes, then improve rankings in
search lists.
The most popular approach to manipulate transaction and
reputation data is Click Farming, where sellers use a large
number of customer accounts to create fake transaction records
and give high remarks on products. Professional click farmers
are usually well organized groups or companies containing
thousands of people. Some companies even develop profes-
sional applications that can be deployed on common PCs to
improve productivity [33].
There are two types of click farming behaviours: Centralized
and Equalized. Centralized click farming refers to the scenar-
ios that transactions are randomly generated throughout the
day. A significant feature of this approach is that the cheating
transactions usually assemble together in a short period of
time since most workers work at the same time. Equalized
click farming refers to the circumstances that click farms are
arranged by some well programmed applications or teams
carefully managed and strictly commit transactions according
to a timetable. Thus the transaction distribution may not vary
too much with and without click farming.
A research performed in China showed that 81.9% of
investigated people had heard of the behaviour of click farm-
ing, 51.2% are aware of click farm and 18.9% of them
had experience of click farming themselves [34]. American
researchers reported in 2015 that over 11000 sellers on Taobao
were detected to have click farmed records and only 2.2% of
4000 investigated dishonest sellers had been penalized because
of the cheating attempts [35].
Current detection techniques for click farming mainly focus
on user behaviours, such as browsing frequencies and periods,
most common purchasing time, favourite products, remarks
and whether they communicate with sellers [36]. Those tech-
niques require the platform to keep lots of records and user
features. However, the detection can be easily bypassed by
trained workers and some well programmed applications.
Although it is hard to classify users as honest or malicious,
we can still find clues from the sellers’ aspect. For normal
sellers, their customers are usually similar since choices of
products are seldom changed. Therefore, the distribution of
transactions in a fixed period of time, say one day, is relatively
stable. No matter how much alike between honest users and
robots or the employed workers, the fake transaction records
will always cause a bias or distortion of the original transaction
distribution. To better observe the problem, we downloaded a
real world data set containing Taobao online sellers’ transac-
tion records and emulated the circumstances if it had been
click farmed (see section V-A). Fig. 1 shows the difference
between normal and click farmed distributions of one day in
Fig. 1: Example cumulative distribution function of original
and click farmed daily transaction data
the data set. Thus, if we can measure the similarity between
different transaction distributions, there is still a chance for us
to detect dishonest sellers.
III. PRELIMINARIES
Statistical divergence, also called statistical distance, mea-
sures the similarity between two or more distributions. Math-
ematically, statistical divergence is a function which describes
the “distance” of one probability distribution to the other
on a statistical manifold. Let S be a space of probability
distributions, then a divergence is a function from S to non-
negative real numbers:
D(·||·) : S× S→ R+ ∪ {0} (1)
Divergence between two distributions P and Q, written as
D(P ||Q), satisfies:
1) D(P ||Q) ≥ 0,∀P,Q ∈ S
2) D(P ||Q) = 0, if and only if P = Q
For our purposes, we do not require the function D to
have the property: D(P ||Q) = D(Q||P ). But we do need
it to be true that if Q is more similar with P than U , then
D(Q||P ) < D(U ||P ). There are ways to calculate divergence,
several frequently used divergence metrics are as follows:
A. Kullback-Leibler Divergence
Let P,Q be discrete probability distributions, Q(x) = 0
implies P (x) = 0 for ∀x, the Kullback-Leibler Divergence
from Q to P is defined to be:
KLD(P ||Q) =
∑
Q(x)6=0
P (x)log
(P (x)
Q(x)
)
(2)
For P,Q being continuous distributions:
KLD(P ||Q) =
∫
q(x) 6=0
p(x)log
p(x)
q(x)
dx (3)
B. Jensen-Shannon Divergence
Let P,Q be discrete probability distributions, Jensen-
Shannon Divergence between P and Q is defined to be:
JSD(P ||Q) = 1
2
KLD(P ||M) + 1
2
KLD(Q||M) (4)
where M =
1
2
(P +Q).
A more generalized form is defined to be:
JSD(P1, . . . , Pn) = H
( n∑
i=1
piiPi
)
−
n∑
i=1
piiH(Pi) (5)
where H is Shannon Entropy, M =
n∑
i=1
piiPi and
n∑
i=1
pii = 1.
Especially, if pii =
1
n
, then:
JSD(P1, . . . , Pn) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
KLD(Pi||M) (6)
Jensen-Shannon divergence has some fine properties:
1) JSD(P ||Q) = JSD(Q||P ),∀P,Q ∈ S.
2) 0 ≤ JSD(P1, . . . , Pn) ≤ logk(n). If a k based algo-
rithm is adopted.
3) To calculate JSD(P ||Q), it need not necessarily to be
true that Q(x) = 0 implies P (x) = 0.
C. Bhattacharyya Distance
Let P,Q be discrete probability distributions over same
domain X , Bhattacharyya Distance between P and Q is
defined to be:
BD(P ||Q) = −ln
(∑
x∈X
√
P (x)Q(x)
)
(7)
D. Hellinger Distance
Let P,Q be discrete probability distributions, Hellinger
Distance between P and Q is defined to be:
HD(P ||Q) = 1√
2
√√√√∑
x
(√
P (x)−
√
Q(x)
)2
(8)
E. Kolmogorov-Smirnov Statistic
Let P,Q be discrete one-dimensional probability distribu-
tions, CDFP and CDFQ are their cumulative probability
functions respectively, Kolmogorov-Smirnov Statistic between
P and Q is defined to be:
KSS(P ||Q) = sup
x
|CDFP (x)− CDFQ(x)| (9)
Algorithm 1 SDD-R
Input: Data Collections D = {D1, . . . , Dn}
Input: Estimated anomalous probability α
Output: Anomalous Data Collections
1: for i← 1 to n do
2: Pi ← the distribution of Di
3: end for
4: PR ← 1n
∑n
i=1 Pi
5: for i← 1 to n do
6: di ← D(Pi||PR)
7: end for
8: N (µ, σ)← Gaussian distribution estimated by di
9: return {Di|di−µσ > 3}
IV. STATISTICAL DETECTION
Diverse data sets in the real world show certain structures
caused by hidden patterns or relationships among records. For
example, traffic volume in the highway and the business trans-
action records, they may show a relatively stable distribution
in the daily scale. Manipulation on those data (e.g. Fig. 1)
results in a drift or distortion of the distribution, which can be
captured to trigger an alarm.
A. Statistical Divergence Detection with Reference(SDD-R)
From Section III we know that statistical divergence only
provides a distance between two or more distributions. In a set
of data collections, we can only draw a complete graph where
nodes denote data collections and edges refer to the symmetric
divergence between two connected nodes. From the graph we
can find some points that have apparently larger distances with
most of other points and return them as anomalies. This may
work if anomalous nodes do not compose a large proportion.
However the procedure will be too complicated to work out
with large amounts of data. If it is assured that data collections
form only one cluster, some optimizations can be applied to
reduce complexity.
Alternatively we can provide a frame of reference that
generates absolute coordinates rather than the relative ones.
This optimization is feasible if data collections form one single
cluster in distribution space. This is true in most reality scenar-
ios given that distribution is adopted to depict a macro property
which comes out as one universal conclusion. In other words
, if multiple distributions are used to describe subgroups of
entire sample space, then a conclusive one can be obtained by
averaging all these sub-distributions. Therefore, we can use an
estimate cluster center as reference and test distances between
the reference and each other data collections(Algorithm 1),
yielding absolute distances.
Fig. 2 shows distribution of all divergences against the
reference. It can be approximated as a Gaussian distribution
though the true one may differ a little more from the standard
Gaussian than the expected estimation error. That is due to the
unknown randomness within real world data. Few assumptions
can be applied in real world data sets, no mention that data
Fig. 2: Distribution of Jensen-Shannon divergence on Taobao
data set(without click farming) used in the experiments.
volume is sometimes relatively low. This topic is out of the
domain discussed in this paper and we here only introduce the
technique instead of the specific distribution model. Certainly,
if stronger assumptions can be included to provide a more pre-
cise model, this component in the framework can be replaced
to give better results. For the simplicity of our proposal, we
deem the distributions of divergences to be Gaussian.
By this approach, time complexity can be reduced from
quadratic to linear. Fig. 8 in Section V-B demonstrates the
result of the above process. Red distribution refer to the
distances calculated from normal data collections, blue and
green ones are from click-farmed data collections. Clearly,
distances of normal data collections assembles together around
a small value while anomalous ones lay around a larger
distance value.
B. Optimization: Statistical Divergence Detection with
Evidence(SDD-E)
It is possible to further optimize SDD-R if we can provide
this algorithm with evidence(Algorithm 2).
Evidences enables the algorithm to not only refine estima-
tion of real distribution but also build knowledge of anomalous
collections, which is similar to the parameter estimation within
a certain sample set.
According to the property of statistical divergence, we
can infer that the true distribution of divergences calculated
from normal data collections are close to but not exactly a
Gaussian distribution N (µ, σ) since for each point, there are
both definite upper and lower bounds instead of infinities.
Therefore, µ should be slightly larger than zero(µ = 0 ⇐⇒
Pi = Pj ,∀Pi, Pj ∈ EN , for real world data sets, this is highly
unlikely). Time complexity for this algorithm is still linear but
with a larger coefficient.
For certain divergence, it is possible to compare similarity
from one distribution against multiple others, such as Jensen-
Shannon Divergence. Although it reduces time complexity,
it sacrifices unaffordable accuracy because divergence among
multiple distribution dilutes differences. Take JSD as an ex-
ample, suppose P (1) = P (2) = P (3) = 13 and Q(1) =
1
6 , Q(2) =
1
3 , Q(3) =
1
2 , then JSD(P ||Q) ≈ 0.033 and
JSD(P, P, P,Q) ≈ 0.024.
Algorithm 2 SDD-E
Input: Evidence set with normal data collections EN =
{N1, . . . , Nn}
Input: Evidence set with anomalous data collections EA =
{A1, . . . , Am}
Input: Estimated anomalous probability α
Input: New data collection D = {D1, . . . , Dl}
Output: Anomalous data collections in D
1: for i← 1 to n do
2: PNi ← distribution of DNi
3: end for
4: for i← 1 to m do
5: PAi ← distribution of DAi
6: end for
7: PR ← 1n
∑n
i=1 PNi
8: for i← 1 to n do
9: dNi ← D(PNi ||PR)
10: end for
11: for i← 1 to m do
12: dAi ← D(PAi ||PR)
13: end for
14: NN (µN , σN ) ← normal distribution estimated from
{dN1 , . . . , dNn}
15: NA(µA, σA) ← normal distribution estimated from
{dA1 , . . . , dAm}
16: T ← proper threshold derived from NN , NA and α
17: for i← 1 to l do
18: Pi ← distribution of Di
19: di ← D(Pi||PR)
20: end for
21: return {Di|di > T}
This algorithm can be slightly modified to deal with con-
cept drift(for example, trading trend changes over time for
online shops as they are often in the process of expanding
or dwindling) by turning the two evidence sets as sliding
windows and adopting certain update strategies such as Least
Recently Used(LRU). Time complexity for this optimization is
O(n · (|EN |+ |EA|) ·TD), where TD denotes time complexity
of divergence calculation.
C. Threshold
One important factor in algorithm SDD-E is the value of
threshold. A lower threshold rejects more instances, improving
the sensitivity of anomalous data while increasing the number
of false alarms. A higher threshold provide higher true negative
rates yet neglecting more possible threats.
A naive but prevalent approach is to set a fixed value as
the threshold(As is shown in Algorithm 1). This approach is
easy to implement and may give satisfying results in specific
cases. However, a fixed threshold requires specific analysis
in the certain scenario, manual observations and tuning of
parameters, which involves lots of human labour. The rule
of “3σ” declares all instances outside [µ − 3σ, µ + 3σ] to
be anomalous. It can be used to automatically determine a
Fig. 3: Threshold can be determined either by a probability
density value, or a radius from the centre. In the scenario
shown in the figure, the threshold can be determined by the
position between two centres of the distribution, denoted as
“T” here. This form of threshold can also be applied to other
types of distributions even there is no intersection between
these two.
threshold. But as a rigid metric, it is merely an estimation of
a suitable boundary considering average situations, which is
far from optimality when concrete data is provided. It would
be either lower than the optimum if anomalous data lies far
away from the normal cluster, or higher than the optimum if
the anomalies sit close to the cluster centre.
Fortunately, applying divergence as the distance measure-
ment among data collections provides a fine property. With a
reference distribution, divergences of normal data collections
form a quasi-Gaussian distribution as we have seen in section
IV-A. The same applies to those anomalous ones.
Moreover, as is verified in experiments, the meta-
distribution of anomalous data collections lies in the right-
hand-side to the normal one on the real line. As shown in
Fig 3, the black curve (PDFnormal(x) or in short PDFn(x))
displays the probability density function (PDF) fitting those
divergences calculated from normal data collections; the blue
curve (PDFanomalous(x) or in short PDFa(x)) displays the
PDF derived from anomalous data collections. Threshold is
chosen to minimize total errors(both false negative and false
positive).
Suppose:
PDFn(x) ≈ N (µn, σn) (10)
PDFa(x) ≈ N (µa, σa) (11)
Then the optimal threshold T is calculated by E.q.(12).
The optimal threshold will minimize total errors and yield an
optimal outcome. However, this is not accurate enough, since
E.q.(12) implicates an assumption that chances are the same
for a new data collection to be either anomalous or not. If
we can determine the probability for a new data collection to
be anomalous in any segment of data sequence, the equation
Fig. 4: Changing of the daily sales volume shows that envi-
ronment of online sales had been changing all the time.
should be modified as E.q.(13), where α is the anomaly
probability.
Moreover, with an estimated anomaly probability, SDD-R
can be also optimized by ranking all data collections according
to their divergence value and select first n·α ones with highest
values as anomalies.
V. EVALUATION
Our algorithm was implemented and interpreted in Python
3.5.2. All experiments were tested on Ubuntu 16.04. In the
following experiments, we figured out properties of real world
data and performance of our technique against anomalous data
collections. We also made a comparison among variations of
SDD algorithms and MGoF.1
A. Methodology
We adopted two data sets: 1) Koubei sellers’ transaction
records2; 2) Synthetic random distribution data set. Koubei
data set was provided by Alibaba Tian Chi big data competi-
tion where all records were collected from real world business
scenarios. It contained information about seller features, user
payments and browsing behaviour. We randomly chose one
seller (ID: 1629) and extracted transaction history of this seller,
records ranging from Nov. 11th 2015 to Oct. 31st 2016. Entire
transaction set was then divided into 325 collections, each
containing records in one day. Fig. 4 and 5 give an overview
of it.
Two types of click-farmed data was generated according to
patterns described in section II-B. To emulate centralized click
farming, we randomly inserted some Gaussian-distributed
transactions in the chosen collection. As for emulating the
equalized click farmers, we simply doubled each record in
the chosen collection to make the new distribution exactly
1All resources and more detailed experiment results can be retrieved online:
https://github.com/TramsWang/StatisticalAnomalyDetection
2https://tianchi.aliyun.com/competition/information.htm?raceId=231591
Fig. 5: We selected 3 days randomly and drew sales distribu-
tion by counting hourly volume. Although sales volume has
changed from day to day, the shape of the distribution remain
almost alike.
the same as the original one, which is harder for the online
platform to discover. Usually, the click-farmed transactions are
several times more than the volume it originally has, if the
seller hires a group of organized workers. In our experiments,
we use ν to denote the magnitude coefficient of click farming.
Hence |Danomalous| = (1 + ν)|Dnormal|. In the following
experiments without extra illustration, we adopted ν = 1.
One defect of this data set is that the detailed time stamp
is aligned at each hour of the day due to desensitization.
We constructed an enhanced data set by assigning every time
stamp a random value for minutes and seconds. Therefore, the
enhanced data set should be closer to the reality.
The synthetic data set was divided into four sections. First
two sections contained sample sets drawn from a uniform and
a Gaussian distribution respectively. The third section used a
mixture of one uniform distribution and two Gaussian distribu-
tions to simulate a random-shaped distribution. Moreover, we
made the random-shaped distribution drift slightly to form the
last section of test data. Corresponding anomalies were drown
from distributions with deviated parameters respectively.
We adopted histograms to depict distributions of any shape.
Surely, the kernel density estimation approaches will give
smooth and continuous estimations on any sampled data. But
the computational cost will be too much to afford. Step size
of histograms is chosen by:
l = cσk−0.2, (14)
where k is sample size, c is a constant relative to the shape
of distribution (e.g. for normal distribution, c = 1.05) and σ
the standard deviation. For data sets with a large number of
elements, a random sampling method, such as Monte-Carlo
method, can be applied to speed up the estimation procedure.
Divergence metric adopted in each SDD algorithms was
Jensen-Shannon divergence if no specific notation is made.
However, MGoF used only Kullback-Leibler divergence due
to its special mechanism. We use a “+” to denote algorithms
optimized by a given α.
T = argmin
T
∫ T
0
PDFa(x)dx+
∫ sup(D)
T
PDFn(x)dx
≈ argmin
T
∫ T
−∞
e
− (x−µa)
2
2σ2a√
2piσa
dx+
∫ +∞
T
e
− (x−µn)
2
2σ2n√
2piσn
dx
=

1
σ2a − σ2n
[
(σ2aµn − σ2nµa)± σaσn
√
(µa − µn)2 + 2(σ2a − σ2n)ln
σa
σn
]
, σa 6= σn
µn + µa
2
, σa = σn
(12)
Note: when σa 6= σn, keep the root s.t. T − µa
σ3a
e
− (T−µa)
2
2σ2a <
T − µn
σ3n
e
− (T−µn)
2
2σ2n
T = argmin
T
α
∫ T
0
PDFa(x)dx+ (1− α)
∫ sup(D)
T
PDFn(x)dx
≈ argmin
T
α
∫ T
−∞
e
− (x−µa)
2
2σ2a√
2piσa
dx+ (1− α)
∫ +∞
T
e
− (x−µn)
2
2σ2n√
2piσn
dx
=

1
σ2a − σ2n
(σ2aµn − σ2nµa)± σaσn
√
(µa − µn)2 + 2(σ2a − σ2n)ln
(1− α)σa
ασn
 , σa 6= σn
µn + µa
2
+
k2ln 1−α
α
µa − µn
, σa = σn = k
(13)
Note: when σa 6= σn, keep the root s.t. α(T − µa)
σ3a
e
− (T−µa)
2
2σ2a <
(1− α)(T − µn)
σ3n
e
− (T−µn)
2
2σ2n
Fig. 6: Examples of 1st and 2nd Level Histogram
B. Experiments on Koubei Data Set
We first tested our algorithms on Koubei data set in order
to see whether and why the algorithm works. Anomalies
were random selected days replaced by corresponding click
farmed version. To play the role of purchasing platform, we
investigated two levels of transaction distribution. The first
level is to simply draw a histogram aligned to time spans.
The second level is to draw a histogram on the sub-volumes
in each time span(i.e. a histogram on frequencies in the first
level histogram, as shown in Fig. 6).
On the raw data set, we had no choice but to set one
hour a basket. While on the enhanced data set, we adopted
E.q.(14) to determine step size automatically. To test SDD-E,
we randomly selected 30 correct days and 10 click farmed
days as normal and anomalous evidence respectively. Here
Fig. 7: 1st level histogram of day 5, 113 and 287, each day in
a column. Distributions after centralized and equalized click
farming are in 1st and 3rd rows correspondingly. And the
original distributions are shown in the 2nd row.
α = 0.2. The results are shown in Table I and II.
When classifying toward 1st level histograms, centralized
click farming behaviours can be easily discovered. As dis-
TA
B
L
E
I:
Pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
on
R
aw
D
at
a
C
en
tr
al
iz
ed
E
qu
al
iz
ed
1s
t
L
ev
el
2n
d
L
ev
el
1s
t
L
ev
el
2n
d
L
ev
el
Pr
e(
%
)
R
ec
(%
)
F1
(%
)
T
(m
s)
Pr
e(
%
)
R
ec
(%
)
F1
(%
)
T
(m
s)
Pr
e(
%
)
R
ec
(%
)
F1
(%
)
T
(m
s)
Pr
e(
%
)
R
ec
(%
)
F1
(%
)
T
(m
s)
SD
D
-R
89
.5
1
48
.7
5
63
.1
2
26
6.
77
21
.9
7
99
.3
8
35
.9
8
11
.1
2
6.
67
0.
63
1.
14
24
9.
15
21
.2
2
72
.5
0
32
.8
3
7.
81
SD
D
-R
+
91
.2
5
91
.2
5
91
.2
5
26
5.
96
61
.8
8
61
.8
8
61
.8
8
10
.0
8
9.
38
9.
38
9.
38
24
7.
31
44
.3
8
44
.3
8
44
.3
8
6.
92
SD
D
-E
St
at
ic
92
.4
6
68
.7
5
78
.8
6
29
2.
50
36
.5
5
98
.1
3
53
.2
6
5.
75
6.
67
0.
63
1.
14
27
1.
45
36
.0
7
86
.2
5
50
.8
6
5.
64
SD
D
-E
St
at
ic
+
85
.0
2
32
.5
0
47
.0
2
29
3.
77
46
.2
4
91
.8
8
61
.5
2
5.
95
10
.0
0
0.
63
1.
18
27
2.
71
43
.6
0
76
.2
5
55
.4
8
5.
68
SD
D
-E
D
yn
am
ic
49
.1
1
99
.3
8
65
.7
3
69
9.
97
23
.0
1
99
.3
8
37
.3
7
24
5.
65
10
.3
6
18
.1
3
13
.1
8
68
1.
09
22
.0
9
93
.1
3
35
.7
1
24
2.
85
SD
D
-E
D
yn
am
ic
+
73
.2
1
98
.7
5
84
.0
9
70
1.
06
48
.0
2
96
.2
5
64
.0
7
25
5.
43
8.
15
6.
88
7.
46
68
1.
89
40
.7
9
78
.1
3
53
.5
9
25
3.
03
M
G
oF
14
.0
8
21
.8
8
17
.1
3
29
2.
14
13
.0
1
4.
38
6.
55
3.
64
12
.5
0
3.
13
5.
00
25
0.
42
12
.5
0
3.
13
5.
00
3.
71
TA
B
L
E
II
:
Pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
on
E
nh
an
ce
d
D
at
a
C
en
tr
al
iz
ed
E
qu
al
iz
ed
1s
t
L
ev
el
2n
d
L
ev
el
1s
t
L
ev
el
2n
d
L
ev
el
Pr
e(
%
)
R
ec
(%
)
F1
(%
)
T
(m
s)
Pr
e(
%
)
R
ec
(%
)
F1
(%
)
T
(m
s)
Pr
e(
%
)
R
ec
(%
)
F1
(%
)
T
(m
s)
Pr
e(
%
)
R
ec
(%
)
F1
(%
)
T
(m
s)
SD
D
-R
81
.5
4
41
.8
8
55
.3
3
23
8.
61
17
.4
9
92
.5
0
29
.4
2
13
.8
6
6.
67
0.
63
1.
14
23
9.
44
21
.1
5
71
.8
8
32
.6
9
12
.0
8
SD
D
-R
+
91
.2
5
91
.2
5
91
.2
5
23
6.
94
36
.8
8
36
.8
8
36
.8
8
12
.9
8
8.
13
8.
13
8.
13
23
6.
47
38
.7
5
38
.7
5
38
.7
5
11
.0
3
SD
D
-E
St
at
ic
88
.3
1
67
.5
0
76
.5
2
25
7.
60
31
.9
9
92
.5
0
47
.5
4
9.
74
6.
67
0.
63
1.
14
25
7.
65
34
.4
9
91
.2
5
50
.0
6
9.
37
SD
D
-E
St
at
ic
+
69
.6
7
13
.1
3
22
.0
9
25
9.
30
42
.1
2
73
.7
5
53
.6
2
9.
59
10
.0
0
0.
63
1.
18
25
8.
45
44
.1
7
82
.5
0
57
.5
4
9.
32
SD
D
-E
D
yn
am
ic
42
.9
3
99
.3
8
59
.9
6
11
06
.2
5
20
.1
2
95
.6
3
33
.2
5
27
7.
70
10
.5
7
17
.5
0
13
.1
8
11
08
.9
3
20
.3
0
94
.3
8
33
.4
2
27
1.
74
SD
D
-E
D
yn
am
ic
+
69
.1
8
98
.1
3
81
.1
5
11
10
.8
1
33
.2
5
87
.5
0
48
.1
9
29
2.
60
7.
06
3.
75
4.
90
11
18
.0
0
37
.2
1
80
.6
3
50
.9
2
28
3.
50
M
G
oF
13
.9
7
17
.5
0
15
.5
4
29
4.
08
14
.6
6
8.
13
10
.4
5
8.
01
12
.5
0
3.
13
5.
00
25
0.
10
18
.4
2
8.
75
11
.8
6
7.
55
Fig. 8: This figure shows distribution of JSD values(on 2nd
level histograms) of normal and two types of click farming
data. Divergences were calculated according to a reference
averaged among all correct distributions.
played in the first two rows in Fig. 7, normal collections
share a similar distribution while centralized click-farmed ones
abruptly violated the original shape. However, as a clever click
farmer, equalized click farming did not in the least distort the
distribution. Most of them escaped the check under perfect
disguises. But when it came to 2nd level histograms, the
“clever disguise” did not work any longer. It can be clearly
seen in Fig. 8 that distribution of divergence of both click
farming types shows an obvious deviation from the normal
one.
The result showed that our technique outperformed MGoF
in every real world cases. SDD-E provided best performance,
yet it consumed the most computing power. Comparison
among SDD-R revealed improvement of reference as well as
the importance of threshold under this technique. Although
dynamic SDD-E consumes more computation power, it is clear
that dynamic SDD-E is capable of tracing the gradual shift of
environment. MGoF turned out to be the worst since it always
mark several false positive when cth had not been met and
much more false negatives when similar errors occurred too
many.
Parameter α improved total accuracy of dynamic SDD-E
algorithm by 10-20% as was supposed. It also increased its
F1 by more than 20%. α made a great difference in SDD-
R as well, which illustrated that divergence sorted almost
all collections in correct order according to the averaged
reference. However, static SDD-E did not show the same
improvement. Since environment drift took greater influence
in the result. In comparison with α, adaptive threshold given
by evidence sets did not bring the most improvement. But
this threshold can be applied together with other optimizations
such as slide windows.
C. Test against Anomaly Proportion and Magnitude
In this experiment, we tested algorithm performance under
various anomaly proportion and magnitude. α ranged from 0.1
to 0.9 when ν = 1 and ν ∈ [0.1, 0.9] when α = 0.1, other
settings remains the same.
Fig. 9: Accuracy and F1 on Different Anomaly Probabilities
Fig. 9 shows that our technique outperformed MGoF and
was relatively stable when dealing with all proportions of
1st level centralized anomalies. SDD-E performed even better
since it maintains knowledge of both normal and anomalous
distributions and calculates the threshold according to the best
expectation. However, it relies on the accuracy of distribution
estimation. When it came to 2nd level distributions, histograms
became much coarser since data available was highly limited
and thus its performance suffered dramatically.
MGoF tended to classify every distribution as anomaly,
therefore benefited most by larger α. It always classifies as
anomalous the first cth distributions supporting every null
hypothesis. Thus when α increased, the proportion of mis-
classified normal collections also became larger, while those
anomalies were still considered anomalous. And given that the
total number of normal collections drops down, the overall
accuracy tended to increase as more instances are correctly
classified as anomalous. However, the right half shows a
different trend. One reason is that MGoF uses KLD other
than JSD. In the Koubei dataset, the discrete estimation of
distributions oscillated in a wide range, leading to that the
prerequisite of KLD is often unsatisfied. Thus the calculation
of KLD may not give a correct measurement. Furthermore, the
2nd histogram provided fewer probability entries than the 1st
level did. Thus it shows a more significant deviation from our
expectation. For the classifiers of MGoF, they compromised to
a high error rate. Because more anomalies gathered together
and the algorithm recognized them as clusters of normal data.
From Fig. 10 we can conclude that our algorithms are
still the best, given that they are most sensitive toward tiny
anomalous variations. However, static SDD-E did not rise until
Fig. 10: Accuracy and F1 on Different Anomaly Magnitudes
ν > 1, this is because it suffered from fluctuation on the trade
environment at the mean time. MGoF is not sensitive toward
minor anomalies either. For a relatively small magnitude of
click farming, the classifiers of MGoF quickly degrade to be
trivial. The rigid threshold could not automatically rise up and
was thus far from to optimal.
D. Results on Synthetic Data Set
In this experiment, we tested all seven algorithms on totally
synthetic data sets. Results are shown in TABLE III. It
shows that our technique can be applied towards any kind
of distributions. And these techniques worked better under
irregular distributions since difference were clearer among
these. Comparison between SDD-R and static SDD-E shows
that adaptive thresholds provided more flexible classifiers.
Results under random-shape drifting proves the efficiency of
sliding windows toward drifting context.
The last experiment was carried out on random-shaped
distribution data set, with alpha = 0.1 and rest parameters
the same. Under different divergence metrics mentioned in sec-
tion III, F1 scores were calculated among all SDD algorithms
and ROC curves were recorded on SDD-R and static SDD-E.
Given that MGoF was defined specifically on Kullback-Leibler
divergence, it cannot be tested in the same way. Results are
shown in Fig. 11 and Fig. 12.
It is indicated that Jensen-Shannon divergence is suited to
all techniques due to its symmetry. Kullback-Leibler diver-
gence provides more evident differences when references were
given. Bhattacharyya distance and Hellinger distance turned
out almost as good as Jensen-Shannon divergence, but they
consumed less time. Kolmogorov-Smirnov Statistic performed
relatively poor since it considers only the largest gap between
two distributions, which provides little information.
E. Discussion
MGoF’s learning procedure of anomalous probability hy-
pothesis is inefficient. To maintain a comprehensive knowledge
of anomalies, MGoF has to reserve a single hypothesis entry
for every type of them. But in reality, it is always the case
that we face the heterogeneity of outliers. In the Koubei data
set, there can be tens of anomalous distributions caused solely
by centralized click farming. It takes a long time to discover
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every possible type of anomaly. Besides, if there happens to be
more than cth anomalous distributions of the same type, later
discovered collections will no longer declared to be anomalous
any more.
However, in SDD-R and SDD-E, that is not a problem
since it can map and gather all anomalies together and draw a
universal boundary between them and all normal collections.
These techniques are suitable to all typical divergence metrics
and consume little computation power(except dynamic SDD-
E). The only drawback is that they require comprehensive
estimation of target distributions. Although other parameters
need estimation as well, they are naturally addressable under
big data circumstances.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper proposes a series of collective anomaly detection
techniques, which helps detect data manipulations in mod-
ern data pipelines and data centres. Different from existing
algorithms designed for collective anomalies, our approach
employs statistical distance as the similarity measurement. We
explored several technical points involved in the design of
the algorithm and performed a thorough experiment to test
its efficiency. The comparison experiment also illustrated the
advantages of our technique. It can be concluded that the our
technique can efficiently discover anomalies within the data
collections and the classifier is sensitive enough toward real
world data manipulations.
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